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Abstract 
This study focuses on the issue of economic reforms and its impact on industrialisation 
in India. However, to understand this, it seems also crucial to analyse pre-economic 
reforms. In India, due to the prevalence of high unemployment and overburdened 
agriculture sector, the manufacturing sector becomes very important not only just in 
creating employment but also to boost manufacturing exports. The article examines 
existing literature on industrial sector in India and try to explain the challenges, it is 
currently facing. The 1991 economic reforms in India, removed tariff barriers to foreign 
investments and trade, with a hope that it will encourage foreign investors and ease 
burden on current accounts. The public sector and the role of the state in the economy 
was reduced and bureaucratic controls were dismantled, while at the same time the 
increasing the role of the market and private sector within the economy was 
strengthened. As a result, foreign capital investment and foreign exchange reserves 
improved. The study concludes that more than a quarter of a century has passed since 
pro-market policies were enacted, but such polices did not lead to rapid creation of 
employment opportunities. There has been no rapid growth of manufacturing sector and 
there has been no corresponding decline in the share in agricultural employment. Even 
the much heralded IT sector‟s dramatic expansion over the last two decades has 
provided jobs directly to less than a million people.  
Keywords: Indian economy, manufacturing sector, economic reforms. 
JEL classification: O20, O10, O25, F11. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, India experienced the balance of payments crisis after nearly a decade 
of steady economic growth and stable macroeconomic performance i.e. increased 
investment and lower inflation rates and improvements in growth rates. In fact, the 1991 
neoliberal economic reforms had been preceded by pro-business reforms and India had 
borrowed from the IMF after the second oil shock. Economic reforms continued and by 
the mid-1980s and government undertook further steps to de-regulate industry and 
trade. Economic liberalisation involves adopting more open trade and capital accounts 
policies. However, twenty-five years later, India managed to achieve high GDP growth 
rates, but at the same time very little or negligible employment growth had been a 
feature of the economy under neoliberal policies in India. Even stagnating or falling real 
wages, along with falling wage shares have not moved towards increased labour 
demand in the manufacturing sector. 
                                                     
1
The author would like to thank John Smith and Hugo Radice for helpful comments and suggestions on 
earlier version.  
 
 2 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 6. No. 1, July – Augustus  2018.   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
Soon after independence in 1947, India adopted mixed economic policies, 
despite the fact that the private sector was much larger than public sector, but the 
government exercised a large degree of control via “license raj” to a less regulated and 
more open economy with the private sector designed to play a more significant role than 
the public sector. The Indian government took a number of initiatives to enhance 
industrial and agricultural development, and also had focused on domestic demands and 
less relied on export-led growth. But the biggest failure was that it did not make any real 
impression on the country‟s huge unemployment problems. A number of measures were 
taken to stimulate and promote domestic industrialisation. However, the options for 
industrialisation began to be exhausted by the mid-1970s and the big industrialists saw 
that only collaborations and joint ventures, along with the availability of foreign 
borrowing and foreign markets, could further their interests. In addition, some high tech 
and IT companies found their interests lay with increased global market integration and 
gaining more access to foreign technology to improve efficiency and productivity, and 
enhance their growth. All these domestic changes led to the launching of neoliberal 
reforms, which began in the early 1980s and with major large-scale policy change in 
1991 (Siddiqui, 2018; 1991). Industries in India tend to be dominated by a large number 
of small enterprises and a few large companies. Since the neoliberal was pursued, the 
India‟s engagement with the global economy has increased rapidly. 
The study contributes by critically looking at not only the issue of growth rates, 
but also at the performance of the manufacturing sector. There seems to be a gap in the 
literature because most research has chosen to highlight the overall GDP growth rates of 
the Indian economy (Basu and Maertens, 2007), but little has been written about the 
industrial sector‟s importance, performance and near stagnation in overall job creation 
since economic reforms were launched in 1991. The aim of this study is also to provide 
a critical assessment of neoliberal reforms and its implications on Indian economy. The 
industrial sector has languished at around 16% of GDP, which is much less than that of 
China or any other country at India‟s stage of economic development (Siddiqui, 2018; 
also 2016a). 
The economic reforms of 1991 has provided to big boost to the rapid growth in 
the service sector and it seems that India is experiencing modernisation and economic 
re-structuring without going through the intermediate phase of a significant expansion 
of the manufacturing sector. The aims of the neoliberal policies adopted in 1991 were 
mainly: to remove the capital control on production, prices and market forces to 
influence investment and operational decisions; to allow international prices and market 
competition to influence economic decisions; and to liberalise the financial sector and 
remove controls over the banking sector (such as reducing state-directed credits and 
freeing the interest rates); and finally, to privatise public assets (Siddiqui, 2017a). 
Liberalisation of trade and investment rules was relaxed in India in 1991 to attract 
foreign capital and investment, and it was hoped that such changes would be able to 
attract relevant sectors to India from global value chain production, which increasingly 
serve as a location for world market production; however, there had been little success 
to date (Nayyar, 2006). 
For the last more than two decades Indian economic growth reveals that this 
growth is unbalanced in terms of sector i.e. for nearly a quarter of a century the services 
have grown much faster than other sectors in the economy. Growth in the industrial and 
agricultural sector, which provides jobs for the majority of the work force, has been 
slower. Despite high growth rates annually of more than 7%, developing economies 
such as India experienced a slight fall in their share of industry between 1998 and 2010. 
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Their share of agriculture also continued to fall, while the service sector has expanded 
sharply since the early 1990s (Siddiqui, 2014a).  
Despite experiencing faster economic growth for over twenty-five years, this has 
not benefitted agriculture sector in terms of raising farmers‟ incomes and has not 
diverted the unemployed rural people to find jobs. It has not created enough opportunity 
for the people working in agriculture to move out and find jobs in the industrial sector. 
This is because the industrial sector in India has experienced slow growth in 
employment creation i.e. less than 1% per annum. This structurally uneven growth, 
coupled with disproportionate policy and economic interventions, has led to the 
emergence of inter-sectoral differences, marked by agrarian crisis and slow 
industrialisation (Siddiqui, 2014a).  
In 2013, nearly 60% of total employment was still in the agricultural sector, with 
productivity levels which generated incomes which were less than one-fifth of those in 
the rest of the economy (Economic Survey, 2014). Neoliberal policy did not offer any 
policy incentive for agricultural sector on which large number of people rely on for their 
livelihoods. In fact, if productivity in agricultural sector rises then this sector needs to 
employ less people. Therefore, the development of the manufacturing sector is crucial 
for overall productivity growth in the economy.   
Despite the rapid success in the GDP growth rates the country has achieved 
since reforms, in terms of employment it still remains primarily an agricultural economy, 
accounting for nearly two-thirds of total employment and a fifth of the country‟s GDP. 
Between 1983 and 1993, employment increased by more than 2% per annum. Then, 
from 1994 to 2006, the economy grew faster but employment growth decreased to 1.8% 
per annum. Since 2006 matters have become worse in terms of employment growth. 
Employment elasticity, which is a measure of the jobs that economic growth produces, 
had been 0.44% between 1999 and 2005, while it declined to 0.01% for the period from 
2005 to 2012 (Siddiqui, 2014a).  
Therefore, for a fuller understanding of the performance of the industrial sector 
in India, we must examine at historical perspectives to compare this with past 
performance. According to the official data, during the pre-reform period between 1950 
and 1960, the average annual growth rate in the industrial sector was 6.1%, which 
declined to an average of 4.8% between 1960 and 1980. But the  it increased to 8.2% 
per annum between 1980 and 1990 (CSO, 2014). Despite post-reform period (1992-
2013), industrial growth increased to an average of around 7% for India, while this 
figure was 11% for China for the same period per annum (CSO, 2014). 
This article is organised as following. Following the introduction to this topic in 
section I, section II is briefly discusses the theoretical significance of the industrial 
sector. Section III analyses the relationship between agriculture and the industrial sector 
whilst sections IV and V focus on industrial growth during the pre-and post-
Independence periods. Section VI then examines state vs. market policies, followed by a 
conclusion which summarises the findings. 
Currently, the manufacturing sector contributes nearly 16% to India‟s GDP, 
provides jobs to 10% of the country‟s total workforce and produces nearly 80% of its 
total merchandise exports (Siddiqui, 2018). Although manufacturing sector is relatively 
small in comparison to India‟s whole economy, but there is a huge potential and this 
sector could play an important role in raising the productivity and in its development 
efforts.  
It seems that the international financial institutions and also political elites in 
India have tended to focus largely on GDP growth and overlooked the fact that the 
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economy needs to create more jobs (World Bank, 2006; Economist, 2007). Especially at 
a time when India has the largest number of young people of any country in the world, 
merely providing them with education is not enough. There is a need to find the real 
constraints on the growth of enterprises. 
During the period from 1900 and 1946, the overall growth performance was 
negligible i.e. primary sectors‟ 0.9%, while the secondary sector growth was only 1.1% 
annually (Maddison, 1995). In contrast, after independence, from 1950 to 2015, the 
primary sector in India grew at an average of 2.2% per annum, and the secondary sector 
at 5.3%. Looking at individual decades, growth in the secondary sector was 6.7% in 
1980-1990, and while it slowed down somewhat in the post-reform period (1991-2015), 
the secondary sector still grew at an average of 6% per annum (CSO, 2014; Siddiqui, 
2014a). The past decades in India appear to have witnessed inadequate diversification of 
India‟s production structure away from agriculture and into manufacturing and 
somewhat premature rapid diversification into the service sector, (Siddiqui, 2015a).  
The methodology to be followed here is derived from the aims of the study and 
comparisons of international statistics provide the main means of addressing the 
research questions and the objectives of this paper. Analysing pre-existing secondary 
data is the only possible way to obtain macroeconomic data. These include data from 
Indian government publications and from institutions such as the UNCTAD, World 
Bank and OECD.  
 
THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Let us first define the concept of „industrialisation‟, which refers to the shift in 
the pattern of a country‟s output and workforce towards industry. In the course of 
development, the industrial sector becomes proportionally more import than the primary 
sector both in terms of employment and revenue generation. The past experience 
indicates that the industrialisation seems to be very important in order to achieve 
affluence. Past experiences of developed countries suggest that to become prosperous a 
country needed to swing heavily towards expansion of manufacturing (Raj, 1986). 
Nicolas Kaldor (1967) emphasised that industrialisation is a necessary stage of 
development, since it represents the development of productive forces and technology. 
In the developing countries industrialisation can play an important role as it saves 
foreign exchange by reducing imports and expanding employment opportunities; it 
lessens the burden on the agricultural sector, and also raises the overall productivity in 
the economy. The successful experiences of the industrialised countries also indicate 
that their success had been largely due to their strong manufacturing sector. As Kaldor 
(1967:54) argues that “The kind of economic growth which involves the use of modern 
technologies, and which eventuates in high real income per capita is inconceivable 
without industrialisation”.  
The expansion of industrial sector appears to be very important to the economic 
growth and well-being of the population of developing countries such as India. Kaldor 
(1967) identified what he considered to be the most critical issues in his „Laws of 
Economic Development‟. He sees the wider impact of the manufacturing sector as 
follows: 1) Higher growth in the manufacturing sectors could also lead to an increase in 
labour productivity; 2) Productivity in the non-manufacturing sector increases as the 
manufacturing sector expands; 3) Manufacturing is an engine of growth, not only 
because of higher productivity but also because of the external economies it generates, 
including forward and backward linkages; 4) As the manufacturing sector expands it 
provides job opportunities for the surplus labour in the agricultural sector, which 
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ultimately reduces levels of unemployment and poverty (Kaldor, 1967). Job creation in 
manufacturing is related to the rate of growth of the output or value added. This, in turn, 
is linked with the rate of growth of wages relative to value added. Kalecki (1971) 
referred to the „mark-up price‟ above the costs which the producers are able to charge or 
to the „degree of monopoly‟ in the market.  
Past experiences of a number of countries show that industrialisation is not 
merely an instrument of economic growth but also has an in-built mechanism for 
distributing the costs and benefits of growth. However, it seems that the opening up of 
domestic markets and free trade as strategies for industrialisation can be incompatible 
with the circumstances, particularly for late-industrialising countries. For example, 
South Korea is characterised by active state intervention in the economy and the 
accumulation process was sustained (Amsden, 2003). Protection for certain strategic 
industries by the state in South Korea was considered necessary in order to bring about 
a situation where integration with the world economy would lead to the development of 
industries and expansion in employment domestically.  
During the last four decades, the rapid economic transformation of the East 
Asian countries has become the most important development in the world economy. For 
instance, initially the development in Japan, then South Korea and most recently in 
China has been the most spectacular and the most widely discussed (Siddiqui, 2009; 
Das, 2006). However, proponents of „outward-looking‟ industrialisation policy overlook 
the differences among the East Asian countries that successfully followed this policy 
(Siddiqui, 2013). Japan and South Korea had almost no foreign direct investment capital 
flows, while the economies of East Asian countries like Hong Kong, Singapore 
(Siddiqui, 2010) and more recently, China, have been dominated by inflows of foreign 
capital (Sen, 2007).  
For instance, when we compare with China, both countries had roughly same 
levels of industrialisation in the 1950s; India, rather, at this time had slightly more 
developed industries than China, but by 2015 China became the world‟s second-largest 
manufacturing country, while India ranked tenth, producing one-quarter of China‟s 
industrial output (Nagaraj, 2017) At present, India and China are among the fastest 
growing economies in the world. Despite the differences in the performance of the 
industrial sectors in both countries, industry could have a vital role to play in improving 
the economy, productivity and living conditions of their people. These two countries 
together constitute nearly 40% of the world‟s population. Therefore, what happens to 
China and India is of great importance to academics and policy makers (Siddiqui, 
2009).Manufacturing activities can be regarded as a critical engine of growth for the 
economy. The development of the manufacturing sector is seen to be crucial in order to 
allow India to expand supply and reduce the risk that the current growth spurt might not 
be sustainable because of supply side constraints (Economist, 2007). 
In the light of a recent study by Dani Rodrik (2016), there is a need to revisit the 
question of industrialisation, which is still very important for creating employment, 
diversifying the economy and removing the low productivity workforce from 
agriculture. However, according this study, the increased global integration and 
liberalisation has led to de-industrialisation in some regions. It is very important for a 
country like India to draw lessons from such a potentially adverse impact, which could 
be a huge destabilising factor in India. As Rodrik (2016:2) argues: “With some 
exceptions, confined largely to [East] Asia, developing countries have experienced 
falling manufacturing shares in both employment and real value added, especially since 
1980s. For the most part, these countries had built up modest manufacturing during the 
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1950s and 60s, behind protective walls and under policies of import substitution. These 
industries have been shrinking significantly since then. The low-income economies of 
sub-Saharan Africa have been affected nearly as much by these trends as the middle-
income economies of Latin America – though there was less manufacturing to begin 
with in the former group of countries…Developing countries are turning into service 
economies without having gone through a proper experience of industrialisation. I call 
this premature deindustrialisation.” 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY 
Agriculture and industry are closely inter-related, as the performance of one 
sector affects that of the other. The agricultural sector provides raw materials for 
industries and also offers an important market for locally produced manufacturing 
goods (Siddiqui, 2015a). Earlier discussion of the relationship between industrialisation 
and agriculture by Prebisch, Lewis and others focused on agricultural growth as a very 
important stimulus towards rapid industrialisation through transfer of savings. Lewis 
(1954) emphasised that the agricultural sector plays an important role as a supplier of 
surplus to industry. He suggested that the supply of surplus from the agricultural sector 
and also a constant supply of workers at low wages could be important factors towards 
industrial growth. Lewis (1954) argues that: “Industrialisation is dependent upon 
agricultural improvement; it is not profitable to produce a growing volume of 
manufactures unless agricultural production is growing simultaneously. This is also why 
industrial and agrarian revolutions always go together. Economies in which, agriculture 
is stagnant do not show industrial development” (Lewis, 1954:433). 
Demand-side constraints and how these might impact on the demand for 
industrial product in the domestic market was another major issue. Kaldor (1967) 
focused specifically on the demand-side problem of industrial growth. According to him, 
the growth of agricultural surplus is an essential condition to raise the purchasing power 
necessary for sustaining industrial growth. Kaldor suggests that to sustain 
industrialisation the terms of trade between these two sectors should be in favour of 
agriculture. He further argues that agricultural productivity should be improved with the 
help of technology to increase surplus and that would keep the food prices low, while 
increasing the demand for industrial goods (Kaldor, 1967).  
The Prebisch-Singer model emphasises that elasticity is generally greater for 
manufacturing than primary products. Prior to industrialisation a country obviously had 
to resort to importing industrial goods and exporting primary goods. Prebisch-Singer 
OR Prebisch and Singer also noted that the terms of trade in the past had often been 
against the interests of primary producers, meaning that under such circumstances a 
country‟s imports of industrial goods would be limited by its export earnings (Siddiqui, 
1998). Thus, the dependence on importing industrial goods and modern technology 
would limit the possibilities of income growth. Under such circumstances, an import 
substitution policy would help the country to relax these constraints by economising on 
the use of foreign exchange (Singer, 1987).  
Moreover, the financing of the investment required by industries could be done 
by transferring funds from the agricultural sector. The terms of trade were favourable in 
the agricultural sector in India, especially in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, but 
the outcome was that neither the industrial sector nor the rural poor benefitted from this. 
The Indian government refused to tax rich farmers and large land owners to raise 
revenue. As a result, the rural rich siphoned off most of the surplus, since they did not 
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pay any direct taxation and deprived the rural poor by undermining land reforms and 
not implementing minimum wages (Siddiqui, 2015a).  
It appears that in the absence of significant improvement in the rates of growth 
in agriculture, in the near future there will be greater willingness to use imports to 
dampen down rising prices and place constraints on the supply of raw materials. K. N. 
Raj has commented: “Private consumers demand in a country such as India depends to a 
large extent [...] on how things go in the agricultural sector. If output and income in this 
sector are rising rapidly, consumer demand for both agriculture and non-agricultural 
product can also be expected to increase rapidly, the latter being even more than the 
former since higher proportions are generally spent on non-agricultural products as 
levels of income rise (Raj, 1986: 225). 
The share of agriculture in terms of GDP in 1950-51 was 56.70%, while its share 
in total employment was 85% for the same period. The share of agriculture in GDP fell 
sharply thereafter, and by 2015-16 it was 13.05%, while the fall in the share in the 
agricultural employment was much slower (55%), and more than half the population 
still depends on agriculture for their livelihood, as shown in Table 1.    
Table 1. Share of agriculture in GDP and employment in India, between 1950-51 and 2015-16. 
Year 
Share of agriculture in GDP at 
1999-2000 prices (%) 
Share of agriculture in 
employment (%) 
1950-51 56.70 85.0 
1960-61 52.48 77.3 
1970-71 46.00 63.9 
1980-81 40.00 60.0 
1991-92 34.04 58.1 
2001-02 25.18 57.3 
2011-12 14.00 56.0 
2015-16 13.05 55.0 
Source: National Sample Survey, various years, Central Statistical Organisation, Government 
of  India, New Delhi 
 
INDUSTRIALISATION DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD: 1757-1947  
During the colonial period, modern industrial development in India was only 
carried out by the private sector because state investment in the industrial sector was 
dismal (Siddiqui, 1996). Academics have already discussed the 19
th
 century impact of 
the British rule on Indian industry, especially the decline of the indigenous handicraft 
manufacturing sector (Dutt, 1902; Anstey, 1957; Thorner, 1962; Siddiqui, 1990). 
However, the neoclassical economists choose to ignore past economic realities, failing 
to say anything about how a handful of metropolitan countries controlled global 
resources and created a new international division of labour to further their economic 
and strategic interests (Chang, 2010; Reinert, 2007; Siddiqui, 1990). 
British rule in India lasted for nearly 200 years. In terms of policies, it could be 
divided into three phases. The British‟s own class forces changed which led to changes 
in policies in India. The first phase (1757-1813) could be termed as the merchant capital 
period. During this period, merchants enjoyed monopoly trade between India and 
Europe, dominated by the „East India Company‟, a British trading company based in the 
City of London. During the second phase (1813-1890), the trade monopoly of the „East 
India Company‟ was abolished and policies in India were enacted to promote British 
industrial capital. In the third phase (1890-1946) was led by the interest of the finance 
capital and it was dominated by the export of capital from Britain to India for mining, 
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tea plantations, railways etc. During this period British investment in India was one-
sided and did not stimulate overall industrial growth in India. Moreover, vast funds 
were spent for unproductive purposes such as the military, colonial administration, etc. 
while productive activity was confined largely to the extraction of raw materials. Even 
the banks and insurance companies were developed to stimulate the production of raw 
materials (Siddiqui, 1990:65).  
The primary method of surplus extraction in India was in the form of land 
revenue levies. Initially the East India Company‟s trade was based on the import of 
Indian piece goods (such as muslin and calico), spices, indigo and silk. The trade was 
financed by the export of Treasury bullion from Britain. However, after the occupation 
of Bengal, the Company gained ultimate control of resources beyond their wildest 
dreams which they were able to exploit without having to pay but were able to sell at 
full price. This could be achieved by treating the entire revenue of India as gross profit 
(Bagchi, 1976). As Habib (1984) argues, following the Plassey victory in 1757 i.e. 
occupation of Bengal: “enormous individual fortunes were made, […] followed by a 
continuous extraction of wealth, through taxation, monopoly and corruption” (Habib, 
1984: 5). 
The benefits that the industrialised countries derived from their colonial markets 
are ignored in the mainstream arguments (Krueger, 1987). The Colonies provided 
markets, supplied raw materials and cheap labour. The economic policies were 
formulated in the Colonies to suit the metropolis. For Britain, for example, the access to 
colonial markets provided assured markets for their manufactured goods but at the same 
time British protectionism ensured that Indian manufactured goods could not be sold 
into British markets (Siddiqui, 1990). The supply of cheap raw materials from India 
minimised inflation in Britain. Until the end of the 19
th
 century, nearly half of British 
exports consisted of cotton textiles, destined chiefly for India and China, ironically at 
the same time that these two countries were themselves experiencing de-
industrialisation, massive unemployment and poverty (Siddiqui, 2009). The 
international division of labour was created with the metropolis producing 
manufactured and exported high-end goods while the Colonies served as a source of 
raw materials and primary commodities.  
For the Colonies, the notion of „comparative advantage‟ meant that they had to 
specialise in the production and export of raw materials. In fact, the adoption of such 
policies led to the perpetuation of mass poverty and famine in India for the whole of the 
19
th
 century and first half of the 20
th
. India proved to be useful to Britain as the surplus 
extracted from this colony was used to settle its deficits with the other industrialised 
countries whose goods it had imported. During the period from 1900 to 1946, India 
experienced near stagnation in per capita income, while GDP growth was minimal. 
Maddison estimated that growth in national output was only 0.81% per annum, whereas 
growth in per capita was dismal, being just 0.04% per annum (Maddison, 1995). In 
contrast to this, in the second half of the 20
th
 century the annual growth in GDP was 
4.2% and per capita income was 2.1%.  
Thorner (1962) analysed the issue of the destruction of handicrafts in India. He 
defined de-industrialisation as either a decline in the proportion of the working 
population engaged in the industrial sector or a decline in the proportion of the total 
population dependent on the industrial sector. Thorner argues: “India‟s national 
handicrafts have declined sadly from their pristine glory. This falling-off, however, was 
not a phenomenon peculiar to India but a worldwide development affecting countries at 
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different times. The ruin sooner or later of the old style craftsmen, was an integral part 
of the Industrial Revolution as the coming of the factory system” (Thorner, 1962: 70).  
However, it seems that such an argument ignores that industrial development in 
Britain as a colonising power and India as a colonised country had taken place in 
different circumstances. For example, in Britain, the traditional industries such as 
handicrafts faced destruction in the 19
th
 century due to the rapid development of 
industries. People lost jobs in the traditional industries but the jobs created in the 
modern industries were much higher than those which were lost. However, the 
experience in the Colonies such as India was quite different. The British government 
used protective measures not only during the early years of the Industrial Revolution but 
right the way through until the 1840s; however, no such protective measures were 
available for Indian industries. In India, handloom weaving and hand-spinning 
constituted the largest handicraft industries, employing a large number of people. 
Therefore, their destruction had a very depressive effect on the whole economy 
(Siddiqui, 1996; Bagchi, 1985). As Bagchi (1976: 154) observes: “Within India herself, 
when de-industrialisation drove labourers to seek their living in agriculture, they faced 
highly imperfect market, the most important complementary asset, land, being already 
concentrated in the hands of landlords”. 
The growth of the British textile industry practically wiped out India‟s cotton 
goods markets in Britain, and even began to seriously threaten Indian industries in their 
home markets. For instance, Britain‟s textile goods exports rose from 0.8 million yards 
in 1815 to 45,000 million yards in 1830; this increased again to 51.78 million yards in 
1835 and had reached 100,000 million yards by 1839. Cotton twist increased from just 8 
IBs in 1814 to 4.56 IBs in 1828 and 10.81 million IBs by 1839. In terms of monetary 
value, Britain‟s total cotton exports to India amounted to £2.29 million in 1839 whilst 
cotton twist was another £0.64 million. But by 1855 these figures had risen to £5.40 
million and £1.27 million, while India‟s manufactured cotton exports declined. For 
example, between 1794 and 1804 India‟s piece goods exports were £2.42 million per 
annum. Later, this figure fell sharply to £0.69 million by 1849 (Anstey, 1957; Dutt, 
1902). Similar trends could be seen in other areas of Britain‟s exports to Indian markets 
with iron bars, machinery, bolts, cutlery, guns, and glasses all having rapidly increased. 
This led to the „de-industrialisation‟ of India. As Habib argues that “The urban decline, 
initiated by the diversion of surplus from the Indian ruling classes to the Company, 
spread quite naturally wherever the East India Company‟s sovereignty extended. It was 
compounded many times over the urban unemployment by English manufacturers. This 
urban decline seems not only to have been in relative terms (percentage of urban 
population to total), but in absolute terms as well” (Habib, 1975: 38). 
The surplus was not invested domestically in India and did not create new jobs. 
As a result the Indian economy became subservient rather than sovereign in terms of 
policy matters. The fruits of its labour were systematically transferred to Britain or its 
new colonies of white settlers. Economic development was hampered by the removal of 
„surplus‟, high land rents and tribute charges, and also by the destruction of the Indian 
capitalist class meaning that they were unable to invest. A densely populated country 
like India was drawn into the orbit of exploitation in the mid-18
th
 century and later on, 
in the interest of British industry, India was utilised as a huge market for their products. 
Moreover, as Bagchi (1985) argues: “Competition from the foreign cloth led to the 
unemployment among handloom weaver, where wages declined” (Bagchi, 1985: 101). 
The huge increase in the cultivation of the opium, indigo, tea and jute led to the decline 
of land available for the cultivation of food crops. As Bagchi notes about the changes in 
 10 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 6. No. 1, July – Augustus  2018.   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
the production structure that, “The trade in opium illustrates how advanced capitalist 
countries have in the past moulded the production and consumption structure of the 
whole subcontinents and have impeded their progress” (Bagchi, 1985: 102).  
 
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE FROM 1947 TO 1990 
On the eve of independence in 1947 modern large scale industries and mining 
contributed just 7% of India‟s GDP, while small scale industries accounted for 10% and 
the agricultural sector 49% and services and construction 34%. Total employment in the 
industrial sector was just 2.9 million people, which amounted to less than 2% of the 
total workforce. In contrast to this, the small industries employed a much higher 
proportion, some 7% of the workforce, while nearly 72% of the Indian workforce was 
employed in agriculture; services including construction employed 18.7% of the total 
workforce. Cotton and jute were among the main modern industries established in the 
early 20
th
 century in India (Siddiqui, 1996).  
In fact, even this lop-sided industrialisation that India had managed to achieve 
under colonial rule was closely linked to British industrial and financial interest rather 
than sovereign industrial growth. The anti-colonial struggle in India had a clear vision 
concerning the need for improvement in the material conditions of life of the people. 
Post-independence India the state played an active role, which was seen as beneficial by 
the industrialists who came up with „Bombay Plan‟, which suggested that public 
investment was needed in key industrial sectors to boost the economy. The policy was 
aimed at developing basic industries via government planning, while the bulk of the 
economy remained in the hands of private enterprises. India‟s first Prime Minister, 
Nehru, was impressed with Soviet economic planning and the USSR‟s rapid capital 
intensive industrialisation. It was said that such strategy posed a constraint on resources 
available for agricultural development. For example, government spending on 
agriculture and irrigation decreased from 34.6% in the first Five-Year Plan to 17.5% in 
the second Five-Year Plan, with investment in heavy industries being prioritised during 
this later period. The second Five-Year Plan in 1956 was launched to build „heavy 
industries‟, which was seen as being essential for the country‟s long term industrial 
growth.  
The “inward-looking” dirigiste economic strategy adopted in pre-reform period 
in India was seen as the most suitable option by the ruling elites. Also known as the 
„import substitution‟ strategy option the public sector was expected to take a leading 
role in the development process. However, such policies were criticised by neoclassical 
economists as inefficient, promoting delays and corruption. The proponents of neo-
liberal reforms argue that: “Rather than adopting the classic Asian strategy −exporting 
labour-intensive low-priced manufactured goods to the West− India has relied on its 
domestic market more than exports, consumption more than investment, services more 
than industry, and high-tech more than low-skilled manufacturing” (Das, 2006:2).The 
aim was to remove serious gaps in the production structure. Due to the long gestation 
period, private investors saw such investments as high risk and also lacked funds.  
On the other hand, the government was determined not to tax the rich. 
Therefore, for public sector investment funding, the government relied on foreign aid, 
deficit financing and indirect taxation. As a result, for example, the share of indirect 
taxes to the total tax revenue increased from 61.9% in 1955 to 70.7% in 1966. Both 
indirect taxes and deficit financing were regressive, meaning that they had a dampening 
effect on income for the majority of people. As a result, the domestic market for mass 
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consumer goods did not increase. Hence, further initiatives for investment and 
industrialisation by private investors were undermined (Raj, 1986).  
Between 1951 and 1965, the annual average industrial growth was 7%, which 
was much higher than anything that had been seen in the past. There was also a notable 
shift as the importance of traditional industries such as jute and cotton declined, while 
modern industries such as machinery, engineering, chemicals, rubber, pharmaceuticals, 
power and steel became more important. However, the industrial growth also coincided 
with huge increments in foreign debts and foreign aid, which meant that 
industrialisation in India was not financially self-reliant. Moreover, Indian industries did 
not allocate much money for research and development, which resulted in increased 
reliance on imported technology and foreign corporations. Although pre-reform 
industrialisation in India was impressive in terms of growth, it failed to make any dent 
on growing unemployment (Raj, 1986).  
Industrial stagnation marked the period from the mid-1960s to the end of the 
1970s. Then in the early 1980s, the government took various measures to promote 
businesses and as a result the economy grew faster in comparison to previous decades, 
but the country relied heavily on foreign borrowings. The fiscal deficit and foreign 
debts had increased to high levels by the end of the 1980s. As a result, the debt service 
ratio had become untenable.  
 
ECONOMIC REFORMS OF 1991 AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
The Gulf War in 1991 added to the India‟s fiscal crisis and a further crisis was 
just waiting to happen. The government decided to accept an IMF loan and under the 
Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, it began to implement neoliberal economic 
reforms. As a result, industrial licensing was discarded and import tariff rates were 
sharply reduced. The IMF and World Bank supported neoliberal reforms since the role 
of the state in the economy would be very limited. The product markets were liberalised 
and there was also a shift from „import substitution‟ to „export-oriented‟ policies 
(Bhaduri, 1993). During the early 1990s, the Indian economy rapidly opened up. It 
seems that this was done not only to enforce a cost discipline on the supply side through 
foreign competition, but also to narrow the differences between domestic and 
international prices.  
The key question arises: What has happened to industrial growth since the 
economic reforms were undertaken in 1991 in India? After two years of negative 
growth, growth rates began to increase in 1994. The annual growth rate in the 
manufacturing sector was 6.4%, which was lower than that during the 1980s, namely 
8.2%. In manufacturing, various industries behaved differently. For instance, consumer 
durable goods continued to grow fastest but the capital goods industry suffered most. As 
a result, the annual growth rate of electrical goods declined by nearly 6.7% between 
1991 and 1999. This was not due to a fall in the investment rate but because of 
increasing import competition, as tariff on imports were substantially reduced during 
this period.  
India‟s foreign exchange balance started to rise from a very low level in 1991, 
when the economy was at very critical level. Exports have risen, especially in software 
and information-related technology. Exports as a percentage of GDP exceeded 10% for 
the first time in 1992 and then remained at around 19%. There was success in both the 
software and the pharmaceuticals sector and Indian corporations also invested overseas 
in buying international companies. Since 2007, a number of Indian companies (such as 
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Tata, Hindalco etc.) went for acquisition in the United States and various European 
countries on the strength of massive foreign currency loans at low costs. 
According to Panagariya (2004) the surge in industrial growth in India which 
took place in the 1980s could not be attributed entirely to the economic reforms of 1991. 
The 1980s industrial policies could not be sustained over a longer period, as they relied 
on huge deficit financing and excessive foreign borrowings. According to Basu and 
Maertens (2007:164) observe: “If India wants to sustain and raise even higher its current 
growth, the main bottlenecks in the Indian economy will need to be addressed. These 
are infrastructures such as roads, expensive freight rates, power supply, ports and 
airports, labour and bankruptcy regulations, and the high level of corruption”. 
Macroeconomic performance is seen to crucial to industrial growth. Table 2 
shows India‟s macroeconomic changes (average annual % changes) from 2013-14 to 
2018-19. The figures of 2017-18 and 2018-19 are projected data from the OECD. 
India‟s rates are projected to remain above 7% per annum, while the consumer price 
index is expected to remain low. Also, imports will remain higher than exports (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. India‟s macroeconomic indicators and projections (annual % changes), from 2013-14 
to 2018-19. 
Indicators 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18* 2018-19* 
Real GDP* 6.6 7.2 7.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 9.4 5.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.6 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 6.0 2.0 -2.5 2.8 4.0 4.2 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -6.7 -6.5 -7.2 -7.0 -6.7 -6.4 
Current Account Balance (% 
of GDP) 
-1.7 -1.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 3.4 4.9 3.9 0.4 4.3 7.3 
Total Domestic Expenditure 2.0 6.9 8.0 5.4 7.5 7.9 
Exports of Goods & Services, 
National Accounts Basis 
7.8 1.7 -5.2 4.5 4.6 5.2 
Imports of Goods & Services, 
National Accounts Basis 
-8.2 0.8 -2.8 -2.3 5.4 6.3 
Net Exports, Contribution to 
Growth of Real GDP 
4.5 0.2 -0.5 1.5 -0.2 -0.2 
Source: OECD, 2017:12. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm. 
Note: *GDP measured in market prices (i.e., at factor costs plus indirect taxes, minus 
subsidies). 
With regard to the comparison between the manufacturing sector performance in 
the pre-and post-reform period, Nagaraj (2006) noted: “The growth rates for the period 
before reforms (1980-81 and 1991-92) are 7.4% and 7.6% per year respectively[...] 
However, there are no statistically significant changes in the trend growth rate of the 
registered manufacturing GDP after reforms” (Nagaraj, 2006: 180). 
The Economic Survey (2014) states that growth is the prerequisite for achieving 
several economic objectives including economic development, industrialisation and 
improving the living conditions of ordinary people. Industrial growth has slowed down 
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since 2012, export growth has also slowed down and all these factors has adverse 
impact on the current account balance (as shown in Figure 1)  
 
 
Figure 1. India‟s macroeconomic developments, 2007-2016  
Source: OECD, 2017. 
Prior to economic liberalisation, domestic savings were mobilised and invested 
in the public sector, which relied on domestic markets. But since the adoption of 
economic reforms, hopes have been pinned upon foreign capital and MNCs to achieve 
modernisation and productivity growth. However, growing trade deficits in the 
manufacturing sector clearly show that the manufacturing sector is losing its 
competitiveness across the range of medium- to high-tech goods. Manufacturing of this 
kind accounted for only 15% of India‟s export earnings in 2010 as against a 
corresponding figure of 50% for China (UNCTAD, 2013: 173) whilst resource- and 
knowledge-based exports account for 25% of India‟s total export earnings. 
It has been claimed that an increase in the rate of investment necessarily 
increases the rate of growth of aggregate supply of goods and services (Srinivasan, 
2005). But if there is no mechanism in the economy which can generate a corresponding 
and equivalent growth in aggregate demand, then an increase in the rate of growth in the 
economy would lead to an increase in unsold goods and services. The intersectoral shift 
in the workforce from agriculture to manufacturing slowed down during the period 
1990 to 1997 and labour productivity in the non-agricultural sector (including 
manufacturing and services) was nearly four times that in agriculture. It clearly means 
that this slow-down in the transformation of the workforce implies an immense loss in 
productivity gains (Siddiqui, 2015a). To regain this loss of momentum in workforce 
transformation and to ensure better utilisation of surplus labour is crucial, lying at the 
heart of equity growth in a large agrarian country such as India.  
However, India‟s investment to GDP ratio has been on a downward trend for 
some years (See Figure 2) and also India‟s invetment is far below than China. Recently, 
 14 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 6. No. 1, July – Augustus  2018.   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
low capacity utilisation and the weak financial position of some corporations have 
damped corporate investment (Siddiqui and Armstrong, 2017b). Several factors have 
added to these cyclical factors such as banking system has been weakened by poorly 
performing public banks, which suffer from high non-performing loans, and also the 
infrastructure bottlenecks (e.g. frequent power cuts) coupled with the often long land 
acquisition process, have held back investment, in particular in the manufacturing sector 
(OECD, 2017). 
 
Figure 2: Investment rates in India, 1998-2016. 
Source: OECD, 2017; http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933453406 
India‟s potential growth is high. According to OECD estimates, it stands at 
slightly above 7% in 2016, largely consistent with other estimates (OECD, 2017) 
However, it has been slightly declining trend since 2012, as the investment to GDP ratio 
dropped from 34% in 2011 to 30% in 2015 (OECD, 2017). Investment is very important 
for the economy and it is a key factor to achieve stronger long-term growth. It also 
requires more public investment to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks. 
India‟s experience over the past few decades indicates that corporations are out 
to make profits by cutting costs, especially the cost of labour. They create more output 
per worker but not much employment. For example, Tata Steel in Jamshedpur increased 
its annual production five-fold from 1 million to 5 million tonnes between 1991 and 
2006, but at the same time it reduced its workforce from 85,000 to 44,000. Similarly, 
India‟s record of employment generation has been dismal for over two decades under 
neoliberal reforms. Despite an annual GDP growth rate of over 7%, growth in 
employment has been less than 1%.  
Moreover, it was expected that an open economy would lead to the availability 
of cheaper capital goods and machinery, and ultimately would result in the expansion of 
labour intensive industries, but this did not happen. The crucial point is whether the 
neoclassical model provides an adequate framework to understand the development 
process of a huge agrarian country such as India. As Bhaduri argues that, “In the 
presence of substantially under-utilised labour, an extensive growth strategy may still 
form an essential element in the early phase of development process [...] indeed there is 
something strange about so much attention being paid to „efficient allocation of 
resources‟ and the price mechanism while ignoring the blatant inefficiency of massive 
under-employment” (Bhaduri, 1993: 11).  
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Large Indian companies welcomed foreign capital and technology. The IT sector 
which is highly competitive found their interests would be better served by closer 
cooperation with global markets. Some small and medium enterprises also welcomed 
this as they found that the foreign technologies; capital and business organisation in 
addition to joint ventures with foreign companies would help them to compete with 
domestic monopolies. For example, increasing the foreign equity limit in Indian 
telecommunications was supported by Bharti Enterprises, as it helped the company to 
enter into a successful partnership with Signtel, Warburg Pincus and other overseas 
companies. India‟s largest companies also found new opportunities to enter the global 
market. Another Indian company, for example, Tata valued at US$ 70 billion in 2015, 
has transformed itself into an Indian multinational company. Its global sales for 2016 
represented more than two-third of its total sales and one-third of its total employees 
work outside India (Siddiqui, 2017a). 
We should not ignore the changing nature of the composition of both Indian and 
foreign markets. The reasons for the slow growth of industries could also explain lack 
of job creation. The sectoral shift in favour of services and economic liberalisation 
means the further opening up of Indian markets has led to the increase in imports of 
goods especially for the richer sections of society. Increased reliance on exports would 
mean Indian industries have to produce goods that are in demand on the world market, 
manufactured using modern technology, which is often labour-saving. Increasing 
reliance on MNCs, which employ capital saving technology and high import intensity of 
domestic manufacturing, reduces the employment elasticity of growth. 
Industries contributed to 26.9% to the GDP in India in 1990, which slightly 
declined to 26.2% in 2000 whilst in 2010, it rose slightly to 26.3%. In contrast to this, 
China‟s industrial sector contribution was higher than that of India i.e. 41.3% in 1990, 
steadily rising to 45.9% and 46.8% in 2000 and 2010. In the case of the manufacturing 
sector, the percentage of GDP is almost double in China as compared to that of India 
(Siddiqui, 2016a). Although exports of manufactured goods have risen in both countries 
between 1990 and 2010, the rate of this increase was much faster in China than in India. 
Such differences in the performance of per capita GDP terms could also be found. Since 
1990 China has witnessed a sharp rise in GDP per capita, while in India this was more 
modest. This was largely due to the dramatic expansion of the industrial sector and 
exports, while India failed to witness any similar rapid expansion in its industrial sector. 
At present, India‟s manufacturing sector accounts for 16% of the GDP and it employs 
about 1% of the total workforce (Siddiqui, 2015b). During the period 1990 to 2000 the 
annual growth of this sector has been 6.8%, while for the same period China‟s 
manufacturing sector witnessed double digit growth of 12.8%, which is nearly double 
that of India (Siddiqui, 2016a). 
Here it is important to look at the industrial sectors‟ contribution to GDP in other 
developing countries such as in 1960 industries contributed 37% of the GDP in Brazil, 
45% in China, 19% in India, 25% in South Korea and 19% in Malaysia (Siddiqui, 
2012b). By 1985, the figures were: 45% in Brazil, 43% in China, 26% in India, 39% in 
South Korea, and 39% in Malaysia. In 2010, industrial GDP represented 28% in Brazil, 
47% in China, 27% in India, 39% in South Korea and 44% in Malaysia (Siddiqui, 
2016b).  
 
STATE VS. MARKET IN FOSTERING INDUSTRIALISATION 
It is important to examine the choices in industrial policy between the role of 
state and market. The development of modern industries has been subject to debate 
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among academics and policy makers, concerning whether industrial strategy should be 
based on „import-substitution‟ or „export-led growth‟. In the neoclassical model, the 
role of the state should be minimal, whilst greater reliance is placed on “market forces” 
(Basu and Maertens, 2007). The mainstream economists advocate for the minimal role 
of the state in the development of the industrial sector and they largely focus on „getting 
the price right‟ (Krueger, 1987). Such arguments run into difficulties when there is 
virtually no past evidence to support this model of development. Successful 
industrialisation in the past was always carried out with active state intervention 
whenever it was seen necessary in order to achieve suitable outcomes (Reinert, 2007).  
However, historical experience for developed countries clearly shows us that 
state intervention is important to promote industrialisation. For example, in the 19
th
 
century the United States had extensive policies in favour of protectionism. Britain also 
adopted protectionist measures and used state intervention to promote its industrial 
sector. In the 18
th
 century British policy was characterised by heavy tariffs to protect its 
domestic industries against the onslaught of cheap foreign goods. Britain had heavy 
tariffs from 1775 onwards, which continued for a century. The British government 
levied export duties, which made raw wool more expensive to foreign producers; at the 
same time it provided tax exemption and monopolies to those who established 
themselves as wool manufacturers. This continued for nearly a century, followed by a 
ban on all export of woollen cloth from Ireland from 1699 onwards. The suppression of 
Ireland‟s domestic woollen industry was seen as necessary in order to build wool 
manufacturing in England. The Western countries who today support the free market, in 
the past saw the active role of the state as essential to achieving desired levels of growth 
and building a strong industrial sector (Chang, 2010).  
Thus, historical evidence concerning successful industrialisation confirms that 
building an industrial base in the developing countries would require state support, 
which would also put a limit on imports ((Siddiqui, 2012a). Otherwise the nation in 
question would be trapped into focusing on exports of raw material and low value 
products as is the case for the majority of the developing countries, a sector that is 
characterised by diminishing returns and often over-supply and negative terms of trade. 
In a broader historical context, Rist argues that, “The historical conditions that would 
explain the „lead‟ of some countries over others cannot enter into the argument, since 
the „laws of development‟ are supposedly the same for all, and „win their way through 
with iron necessity‟ [...] this bracket out the effects of conquest, colonisation, the slave 
trade, the dismantling of craft production in India, the breaking of social structures, and 
so on” (Rist, 2009:75). 
In order to achieve industrialisation, the question arises whether reliance should 
be made on state intervention or market forces in the economy. The Prebisch-Singer 
model argues that government intervention is seen as crucial for successful 
industrialisation since according to them this would lead to diversification of the 
economy and output. This is considered a necessary prerequisite for affluence. As a 
consequence, not only failed to diversify their economy but also unable to draw people 
away from agriculture into expanding manufacturing sector flourished. Higher growth 
in the manufacturing sector could lead to higher productivity not only in agriculture but 
also other industries as well. It has been argued that negative trends in terms of trade 
acts as an impediment to the economic progress of the developing countries (Singer, 
1987; Siddiqui, 2016b). 
However, the past experiences of Brazil, China, India and Mexico tell us that the 
„import substitution‟ policy ran into difficulties after some time (Siddiqui, 2015b) This 
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was due to a number of reasons like in the name of protection of domestic markets: 
inefficiency, rent-seeking, and wastefulness of resources flourished. Local producers 
turned into monopolies and thus were able to charge higher prices than imported prices 
(Patnaik, 2015). 
 
CONCLUSION 
India was the top manufacturing nation until the British conquest of Bengal. In 
fact, colonialism degraded the Indian economy and squeezed the incentives for local 
investment in industry and agriculture. For the majority of the colonial period, Indian 
agriculture stagnated and foodgrain output fell. The primary goal for the British colonial 
administration was to extract revenues from the peasantry. From the mid-18th century, 
India‟s economy was integrated into the British colonial system which, besides 
extracting surplus value, also imposed an international division of labour with unequal 
terms of trade where India was turned into a supplier of primary commodities. During 
the colonial period, the Indian economy became subservient rather than sovereign in 
terms of policy matters (Sen, 1981).  
The study found that soon after independence in 1947, the Indian government 
took a number of initiatives to enhance industrial and agricultural development. 
Initially, these met with some modest success including building key industries, 
becoming self-sufficient in terms of food production and improving literacy rates. 
However, the biggest failure was that it did not make any real impression on the 
country‟s huge unemployment problems. By the mid-1960s economic growth had 
begun to falter and the fiscal crisis of the state deepened. Finally, India sought an IMF 
loan in 1991 to avert balance of payment crisis. In return, India was asked to adopt 
neoliberal reforms (Patnaik, 2015). 
To compare Indian economic policies under neoliberal reforms with those of the 
previous period under dirigisme would seem to be important, particularly when we 
consider this comparison in terms of employment expansion. In the period of neoliberal 
reform, the growth rates accelerated to 7% annually, but the rate of growth of 
employment has remained at only 1%, while in the dirigiste period the average growth 
rate was 3.5%, but the expansion of employment was doubled i.e., 2% annually.  
In fact, in the late 1950s and 1960s the industrial sector did witness a sharp rise. 
For example, the share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 9% in 1951 to 16% in 1961. 
Indeed, a decade later this share reached 18% before reaching its peak of 20% in 1996. 
However, the industrial share in GDP was still less in comparison to other developing 
economies, particularly in East Asia. For example, in 1971, the manufacturing share in 
GDP for South Korea was 25%, Malaysia 28%, Thailand 26%, China 35% and Brazil 
29% (Siddiqui, 2016a; 2018). The study has argued that India‟s progress towards 
industrialisation has been disappointing and the optimism that foreign capital and 
technology would bring efficiency and boost growth in manufacturing has largely been 
proven unfounded. In fact, manufacturing is very important for a country like India, 
where rapidly growing manufacturing, besides earning foreign capital, can utilise 
labour, increase productivity and incomes through linkages and spill-overs into other 
sectors. 
However, since neoliberal reforms were undertaken in 1991, the agriculture 
sector hardly saw any benefits and, during this period, its growth rates were negligible 
(Siddiqui, 2010). The pursuit of neoliberal economic policies has led to the withdrawal 
of the state role in assisting farmers in particular and the rural sector in general, and is 
instead promoting the interests of global financial capital, with which the Indian 
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corporate capital is closely integrated. Despite the fact that the majority of the country‟s 
population has not witnessed any improvement in its living conditions, the government 
nevertheless celebrates this as a “great achievement”; it has completely ignored 
economists such as John Stuart Mill when he said that he did not mind a zero growth 
rate if workers are better off in such a stationary state than in a growing economy. For 
him, improvements in workers‟ real incomes should take priority over high GDP growth 
rates. On this account, the statistics reveal that since the adoption of neoliberal policies 
half of India‟s population has witnessed stagnation in its real per capita income.   
The study concludes that twenty-five years have passed since the neoliberal 
economic reforms were launched in India, but industrial growth has still not witnessed 
rapid expansion, especially in manufacturing areas. And it seems that neoliberal policies 
have failed to create jobs and thus improve the living conditions of significant 
proportion of the population. Therefore, to combat these problems certainly requires 
effective government policy intervention, especially in areas such as education and 
health sectors, which could ultimately have very positive effects on industrial growth 
and productivity.  
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